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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the regulatory and insti-
tutional factors which may increase excessive risk taking in banks. Few
studies deal with the impact of these external factors on bank’s risk tak-
ing and probability of default, despite the fact that empirical investigation
is crucial for understanding the relationship between the regulatory, legal
and institutional environement and bank’s health, especially in emerging
market economies. We apply a two step logit model to a database of banks
from emerging market economies. Our results conﬁrm the role of the in-
stitutional and regulatory environment as a source of excess credit risk,
which increases bank failure risk. The integration of these environmental
variables signiﬁcantly contributes to the explanatory and discriminatory
power of our model of bank default prediction.
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11 Introduction and literature survey
The last 20 years have witnessed several bank failures throughout the world,
particularly in emerging market economies (EME) (Bell and Pain [2000]).
The interest for bank failures comes mainly from its costs : ﬁnancial losses
for the stakeholders (shareholders, clients, deposits insurance fund), loss of com-
petitivity, and a potential destabilization of the ﬁnancial system, through the
contagion mechanisms, when several individual failures lead to a banking crisis.
The resolution of these failures is a waste of resources, particularly scarce in EME
(Honohan [1997])1.
Excess credit risk and bad corporate governance in banks are the principal
internal default factors.
An O.C.C. [1988] study lists the characteristics of failed banks during the 80’s
in the US. The main cause of failure was bad quality of the bank assets. This
quality is under the responsability of bank’s managers. Therefore, ineﬃcient risk
management was at the source of bank default. The four main factors in failed
banks were :
1. inadequate credit policy,
2. inadequate system of control and monitoring,
3. inadequate system of non performing loans (NPL) identiﬁcation,
4. excessive concentration of decision authority.
A recent review of principal banking crisis factors (Llewellyn [2002]) points
out ﬁve common characteristics throughout the world :
• ineﬃcient process of risk analysis, management and control,
• insuﬃcient monitoring,
• perverse or weak incentives structure,
• insuﬃcient information transfer,
• inadequate corporate governance.
1For example, the banking crisis in Indonesia (1997) and Thailand (1997-98) costed about
50-55% and 42.3% of the GDP respectively in term of restructurization (ﬁscal contribution).
2Bad risk management and control generate excess risk in banks. This excess
risk is the output of a credit decision which increases bank default risk to a
level superior to other stakeholders’ objective. The main cause for such credit
risk taking behavior is the fact that the agent who is responsible for the credit
decision doesn’t support all the costs of his decision.
Diﬀerent symptoms of excess credit risk can be found in the relevant literature
(Keeton and Morris [1987], Clair [1992], and Honohan [1997]) :
• low quality of the loans portfolio (high ratio of NPL),
• high concentration of loans in the portfolio (by term, borrower, industrial
and/or geographic sector, type of debt instrument),
• over optimistic evaluation of borrower’s quality,
• insuﬃcient risk pricing,
• high correlations between loans (diﬀerent type of loans and NPL),
• excessive loans growth,
• absorption of risk above bank’s technical capacity.
Concerning the relationship between the control of the agent and his risk
taking behavior, Gorton and Rosen [1995] put forward an explanation of bank
default in US based on ineﬃcient corporate governance mechanisms, which favors
excess risk.
Wage policy is one of the internal corporate governance mechanisms which
is supposed to resolve agency costs problem2(Jensen [1993]). The agent’s salary
(the manager responsible for the credit decision and risk taking) is indexed on
his performance. He also gets shares in the bank’s capital (stock-options for
example)3.
2Notice that banking industry has two main speciﬁcities concerning corporate governance
(Prowse [1995], Caprio and Levine [2002], and Ciancanelli and Reyes Gonzalez [2000]), which
are :
• the opacity of bank assets which exacerbates the information asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders, and therefore increases agency costs problem,
• the regulation of the banking industry, which alters market discipline.
3Houston and James [1995] ﬁnd a positive relationship between insider’s capital shares and
bank charter value, which loss limits excess risk (Charter value can be deﬁned as an intangible
asset which corresponds to expected future proﬁts resulting from banking activity. It is often
assimilated to the banking licence). Ang et al. [2001] and John et al. [2001] also ﬁnd that this
type of wage policy reduces excessive risk taking incentives.
3Following Gorton and Rosen [1995], excessive risk taking incentives depend
of the level of insider’s shares. In a declining industry, where good investments
opportunities become scarce4, bad managers-insiders can preserve their jobs and
increase their revenues allocating loans to risky borrowers. This relationship
between risk taking and the level of managerial holdings is non linear and concave.
For majority holdings, the device is eﬃcient because it disciplines the manager
(in case of excess risk and bank default, he loses his human capital investment
and his shares), therefore reducing the incentives for excessive risk taking even
in a declining banking industry. For minority holdings, the manager keeps his
ability to resist to shareholder’s control (entranchment), while still receiving the
revenues of his shares, through excess risk, which is unobservable by the principal
(shareholder).
This explanation of excess risk is particularly relevant in the case of banks in
EME, where managers and executives often hold shares in banks.
The results of empirical studies on the impact of ownership structure on risk
taking in banks provide mixed evidence. Saunders et al. [1990] ﬁnd that banks
controled by a majority of shareholders-outsiders are less risky. On the contrary,
Knopf and Teall [1996] and Anderson and Fraser [2000] ﬁnd that banks controled
by a majority of managers-insiders are more risky. Demsetz et al. [1997] ﬁnd
that this is particularly signiﬁcant in low charter value banks.
We can notice other bank default factors, which we can call external. These
are macroeconomic and market structure factors. Other default factors are reg-
ulatory and institutional ones.
The main macroeconomic default factors are generally also those which cause
banking crisis, particularly in EME. These factors are among other high inﬂation,
interest rate ﬂuctuations, foreign capital ﬂows volatility, inadequate exchange rate
regime, public debt, ...5. The structural and regulatory change in EME increase
the probability of these macroeconomic default factors. The banks can’t correctly
evaluate the riskiness of their borrowers in a changing economic environment. A
boom & bust cycle can emerge.
A hard competition on the credit market can push the bank to accept ”bad
risks”, oﬀering debt contract’s conditions which don’t reﬂect the riskiness of the
4When the traditional banking activities are declining, consequence of ﬁnancial innovation
and market deregulation, banks are loosing their intermediation advantage (decline of bank-
ing) (Kaufman and More [1994], Edwards and Mishkin [1995], Schmidt et al. [1999]). In
order to keep their activity proﬁtable, banks began either to ﬁnance new activities (oﬀ-balance
sheet, derivatives), or to ﬁnance riskier activities, generating excess risk (Santomero and Trester
[1998]).
5See the contributions of Caprio and Klingebiel [1996], Goldstein and Turner [1996],
Gonzalez-Hermosillo [1999], and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiarche [2000].
4counterparty (or which don’t follow the bank’s credit policy), particularly no risk
adjusted pricing.
Keeley [1990] focus on the relationship between risk taking and charter value.
This charter value is more important when the bank has monopoly power on the
market. The threat of losing charter value disciplines the bank’s risk taking be-
havior. Following the deregulation of banking activities in the US during the 80’s,
the market power of banks eroded, and their charter value decreased. Meanwhile,
the banks had to increase their eﬀorts in order to keep their proﬁts at a certain
level. This have generated excessive risk taking incentives.
Saunders and Wilson [2001] extended Keeley’s work, studying the sensibility
of the relationship between risk taking and charter value to economic cycles.
They ﬁnd that charter value is procyclical. It increases in periods of economic
expansion, and decreases in periods of recession. Therefore, the disciplining eﬀect
of charter value is reduced when the economic environment becomes adverse.
Some theoretical models have also investigated this relationship between ex-
cess risk and competition. Hellmann et al. [2000] ﬁnd that excessive risk taking
can appear in a highly competitive market. Banking regulation can alter this ef-
fect, but generates own adverse incentives. Covitz and Heitﬁeld [1999], Cordella
and Levy Yeyati [2002], and Repullo [2002] ﬁnd similar results.
Excess risk incentives can also have their sources in the characteristics of the
banking regulation, like the deposits insurance system with ﬁxed prime, or the
regulator’s behavior.
The existence of a guarantee fund which insures deposits reduces the deposi-
tors incentives to monitor the bank and therefore reduces market discipline. The
ﬁxe insurance prime incites the bank to use deposits to ﬁnance risky credits and
can generate excess risk.
The regulator’s behavior generates some regulatory discipline6. This disci-
pline is imperfect because of speciﬁc problems like Too Big To Fail (TBTF) and
forbearance (Kane [1989]).
Regulator’s forbearance is a non intervention in a problem bank. This kind
of behavior can lead to a more costly default of the bank, compared to an earlier
intervention. It can also generate adverse incentives for the remaining banks,
which can adopt excessive risk taking behavior. The TBTF problem is the result
of conﬂict of interests between the bank and the regulator, and is also a con-
sequence of the forbearance problem. Big banks, which default would generate
important economic costs (losses for the stakeholders, ﬁnancial system’s destabi-
lization, ...)7 anticipate non intervention of the regulator in case of insolvability.
These banks can engage themselves in excessive risk taking behavior.
6The regulation of the banking industry is mainly motivated by the negative eﬀect of the
externalities of potential bank failures (Berger et al. [1995], and Santos [2001]).
7Failures of National Bank of San Diego or Franklin National Bank of New York in US for
example.
5The intertemporal aspect of bank’s capital regulation can incite to excess risk
(Koehn and Santomero [1980], Kim and Santomero [1988], and Blum [1999]).
The regulatory obligation to hold a minimum level of regulatory capital buﬀer
in period t + 1 puts a pressure on the bank’s proﬁts in period t. The regulation
being costly and reducing the expected proﬁts and charter value, the bank can
be incited to generate the additional revenues by increasing risk taking.
Regulatory and institutional environment’s characteristics can also generate
excessive risk taking incentives.
The work of La Porta et al. (LLSV) [1997, 1998, 2000] puts forward the impact
of the institutional environment’s quality on the protection of stakeholders (pro-
tection of investors from insiders’ expropriation), and on the nature and eﬃciency
of capital markets and the performance of ﬁnancial systems. The laws which gov-
ern the relationship between the stakeholder (principal) and the manager (agent)
are aﬀected by the country’s institutional environment. This environment is a
crucial determinant of the eﬃciency of corporate governance mechanisms which
rules the principal-agent relationship. It can also favors excess risk or reduce the
eﬃciency of its control by other mechanisms and institutions.
Klapper and Love [2002] study the relationship between corporate governance
system and institutional environment in 14 EME. They use governance indicators
from CLSA8. Their results conﬁrm the presence of weak governance in weak insti-
tutional and regulatory environments. This relationship aﬀects negatively ﬁrm’s
performance. Mitton [2002] ﬁnds that ineﬃcient governance mechanisms9 have
weaken ﬁrms and contributed to amplify the Asian Flu. Hussain and Wihlborg
[1999] also ﬁnd that institutional factors have deapen the Asian Crisis, and the
insolvency procedures have ampliﬁed its length.
Barth et al. [2001] study the relationship between bank regulation and su-
pervision and banking industry performance. Their results put forward the role
of market discipline as a crucial element of regulatory and supervision strategy.
This form of discipline seems to be most eﬃcient in monitoring bank’s behav-
ior. Barth et al. [2000] focus on the relationship between diﬀerent systems of
regulatory and types of ownership structure and performances and stability of
banks. Their results show that regulatory restrictions of banking activities aﬀect
negatively the whole industry. The more a market is contestable the more mar-
ket discipline is eﬃcient, and can incite bank behavior to be more conservative.
Calomiris and Powell [2000] ﬁnd similar results in their study of regulatory evolu-
tion in Argentina during the 90’s. This evolution was mainly based on enchancing
market discipline, and incited banks to manage their risks more conservatively,
which is a diﬃcult task after a period of ﬁnancial liberalization.
8Cr´ edit Lyonnais Securities Asia. These indicators reﬂect discipline, transparency, indepen-
dence, accountability and responsability. They’re the result of interviews with bankers.
9Protection of minority shareholders from expropriation by managers-insiders and majority
shareholders.
6Barth et al. [2002] extend this analysis and compare the impact of diﬀerent
supervisory systems on bank proﬁtability. This impact seems weak. A unique
supervisory body increases bank’s proﬁtability.
As we have seen, several bank default factors emerge from the literature.
However, the impact of institutional factors (regulation, rule of law, ...) on fun-
damental internal determinants of default - excess risk - remain neglected.
The purpose of our paper is to study the role of the institutional factors in
driving excessive risk taking. Therefore, we adopt a two step approach (Maddala
[1983]) inspired from Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt [1989b] and Thomson [1992], and we apply
it to a database on EME’s banks which contains accounting, regulatory and
institutional informations (Bankscope, Barth et al. [2001], and La Porta et al.
[1997, 1998]).
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We survey the literature on
predicting bank default’s modelisation in section 2, where we also present our
approach. Our data and main results are presented in section 3. We conclude
our work in section 4.
2 Models of bank default prediction
Several empirical studies on bank default prediction’s modelisation (or early warn-
ing signal (EWS) models) using single equation appeared during the 70’s, mainly
in US10.
At the end of the 80’s, two equations models appeared. Their objective was to
dissociate the internal and external factors of default, and especially to distinguish
the insolvency factors from the regulatory failure factors.
The most frequent time horizon used in EWS models is one year. The deﬁni-
tion of default concerns diﬃculties aﬀecting bank’s solvency. Default banks are
called problem banks.
2.1 Single equation EWS models
The EWS models are supposed to translate diﬀerent bank’s performance and
solvency indicators into a default risk estimation11. Using this estimation, the
regulator can discriminate between more or less risky banks. The early iden-
tiﬁcation of problem banks helps to initiate preventive and corrective actions.
The majority of bank’s default explanation and prediction models are based on
10See Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt [1989a] for a detailed survey.
11Reference models are from US : SEER and SCOR models for example.
7CAMEL typology. This typology uses ﬁve risk factors12 which form a bank’s
soundness rating13.
Sinkey [1975] was the ﬁrst to study problem banks, applying a multivari-
ate discriminant analysis (MDA) to a sample of 220 small american commercial
banks, of which 110 defaults, for the period 1969-1972. From 100 ratios, Sinkey
chooses 10 of which 6 are signiﬁcant. The quality of bank assets is the most
signiﬁcant one. Other most discriminant variables are assets’ composition, loans’
characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and use of income, eﬃciency and prof-
itability.
Altman et al. [1977] also apply a MDA model to a sample of 212 american
savings & deposits banks for the period 1966-1973. They divide their sample
into three sub-samples : problem banks (56), fragile banks (having temporary
problems) (49), and healthy banks (107). From 32 tested ratios, 7 are signiﬁcant.
The most discriminant variable is the operational proﬁt, and its evolution.
Martin [1977] is the ﬁrst to use a logit model. He studies a sample of 5642
healthy banks and 58 failed banks for the period 1970-1976. After testing 25
ratios, 4 are signiﬁcant, mainly the capital asset ratio, and the loans portfolio’s
composition to total assets ratio.
Avery and Hanweck [1984], Barth et al. [1985] and Benston [1985] have also
contributed to the EWS models literature, applying logit models to diﬀerent
samples of banks (respectively 1290 of which 100 defaults, 906 of which 318
defaults, and 890 of which 178 defaults) for various periods during the beginning
of the 80’s, exclusively in US. Generally less than 10 ratios are signiﬁcant, mainly
proxies of the loans portfolio composition and quality, capital ratio, and the
sources of income.
Pantalone and Platt [1987] have proposed a model including most of CAMEL
proxies : proﬁtability, management’s eﬃciency, leverage, diversiﬁcation and eco-
nomic environment. They used a sample of 113 default and 226 healthy banks
for the beginning of the 80’s. Their results conﬁrm that the main cause of default
was bad credit risk management, which occurred as excess risk and/or ineﬃcient
risk taking control and monitoring.
Barr and Siems [1994] propose two new EWS models, with a two years time
horizon. Their model include CAMEL proxies and eﬃciency scores14 as manage-
ment’s quality proxies (the M is the most diﬃcult CAMEL type risk factors to
estimate objectively), and a proxy of the economic conditions. Following Barr
12Since january 1997, a sixth factor has been added - S - for the bank’s sensibility to market
risk.
13See ﬁgure 1 in appendix for a brief summary of the ﬁve risk factors.
14The evaluation of eﬃciency using production frontier methods permit to calculate eﬃciency
scores. These scores measure the distance between each observation and the eﬃcient frontier.
Observations which lie on this frontier are considered as eﬃcient (F¨ are et al. [1994] and Coelli
et al. [1999]).
8et al. [1993], eﬃciency scores decrease three years before bank’s default15. This
sensibility is very useful for management’s quality estimation in EWS models.
Barr and Siems apply a probit model integrating eﬃciency scores obtained
from a Data Envelopment Analysis methodology as management’s quality prox-
ies, with four other CAMEL proxies variables. Their model is more robust and
precise than Martin’s [1977] and Pantalone and Platt’s [1987] models.
2.2 Two equations models with institutional factors
Two equations models allow to dissociate risk factors which aﬀect bank solvency
from external factors (particularly regulatory ones) which drive the regulator’s
behavior, especially his propensity to intervene in problem banks.
Gajewski [1988] was the ﬁrst to incorporate such a distinction between insol-
vency and failure in his model, studying a sample of 2447 healthy and 134 default
banks. Gajewski uses two equations : the ﬁrst models economic insolvency, the
second administrative failure. After testing 25 ratios, 10 are signiﬁcant.
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt [1989b] also propose to treat economic insolvency as one of
the factors inﬂuencing regulator’s decision to intervene and declare a bank failed,
next to other economic, political and bureaucratic factors16, following the work
of Kane [1989]. In the same spirit, Thomson [1992] propose to model the failure
decision of the regulator as a call option. He supposes a distinction between
insolvency and failure, the latter being a regulatory and administrative decision.
His model is build from two equations : the ﬁrst models net value of the bank
(solvency), the second models the bank’s failure (allowing to model the regulator’s
behavior). Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt’s approach is very similar17. Both studies apply a two
step method following Maddala [1983], estimating the ﬁrst equation with OLS
and the second one with a logit model.
2.3 The two step model : a proposition
Our main objective is to study the impact of regulatory and institutional factors
of an EME on excessive risk taking incentives.
A two step approach allows a distinction between regulatory and institutional
factors and excess risk, from the relationship between this internal default factor
and other default factors.
15More eﬃcient banks monitor better their expenses, manage better their risks, and anticipate
better the evolution of the economic environment, in order to adapt their strategy.
16These are information (monitoring costs), legal, political (agency costs), ﬁnancial and ad-
ministrative constraints.
17She introduces a third equation which models bank’s net value of the deposits insurance
contribution.
9In our study, the indicator of excess risk is the ratio of non performing loans -
NPL
GL , which we discretize in order to obtain our ﬁrst dependent polytomic variable
of three classes - CNPL.
It is build as follows :
1 if NPL
GL < 5% (low excess risk)
CNPL = 2 if NPL
GL ∈[5%, 20%] (medium excess risk)
3 if NPL
GL > 20% (high excess risk).
Our second dependent variable is a dummy - DEFAULT - which is equal to
1 if the bank was in default at time t18.
The two steps of our approach are :
1. estimation of the relation between an indicator of excess risk CPNP and
regulatory and institutional factors using an ordered logit model,
2. estimation of a bank default function integrating the estimated value d CNPL
and other risk factors using a binary logit model.
The two equations to be estimated are19 :
CNPL = α(X environmental factors) (1)
DEFAULTt = β( d CNPLt−1) + γ(Xt−1 risk factors) (2)
The variables used to estimate equation 1 are deﬁned in the table 1. The
ﬁrst seven regulatory variables come from Barth et al. [2001] database, the last
institutional variables from La Porta et al. [1997, 1998]. We have selected the
most representatives variables of diﬀerent dimensions of the regulatory and insti-
tutional environment in studied EME.
The variables in equation 2 are respectively d CNPL which is the estimated
value of the excess risk indicator form equation 1, and six proxies variables of risk
factors (see table 2).
18We explain bank default probability with a one year time horizon.
19See Maddala [1983] and Thomas [2000] for a description and discussion of logit models.
10Table 1: Explicative variables used in the estimation of equation 1
Variables Deﬁnition
regulatory proxies
PHOLDEM equals 1 if the ﬁrst holding of the bank comes from an EME
(38.14% of our sample)
MCAR Minimum regulatory capital ratio,
(mean 9.31, standard deviation 1.34, minimum and maximum 8 and 11.5)
DEPOSITINS equals 1 if a deposits insurance system exists
(78.13% of our sample)
FREQEXAM equals 1 (2) if large banks are examined on-site once (twice) a year
(86.93% and 13.07% of our sample)
MISCMGTREP equals 1 if the auditor has the legal obligation to report
management / executive miscmanagement
(45.8% of our sample)
LEGALACT equals 1 if the regulator can use legal actions against the auditors for
neglected work
(88.03% of our sample)
PROHIBABL equals 1 if abroad loan making is prohibited by banking regulation
(13.89% of our sample)
institutional proxies
RULEOFLAW rule of law quality’s indicator
(from 2.08 to 6.78 in our sample, mean 4.95, standard deviation 1.65)
LEGSY SFR equals 1 if the legal system is based on the french system
(81.1% of our sample)
3 Data and results
3.1 Data
We have build a bank defaults database in most of EME from three geographic
zones : Asia, Latin America and CEE20. Three arguments motivate our choice of
these countries :
• the important number of bank defaults in these countries during the 90’s,
• heavier consequences of bank failure in these countries,
• interconnection and globalization of ﬁnancial and banking systems expose
developed economies to heavier diﬃculties in case of defaults in EME.
20Central and Eastern Europe.
11Table 2: Risk factors (CAMEL type) used to estimate equation 2
Variables Deﬁnition CAMEL
category
EQTA Equity / Total Assets C
EQTL Equity / Total Loans C
TA Total Assets A
NPLGL Non Performing Loans / A
Gross Loans
NLTA Net Loans / Total Assets A
LLRGL Loan Losses Reserves / A
Gross Loans
PEXP Personal Expenses / M
Total Operating Expenses
NI Net Income E
NIM Net Interest Margin E
ROA Net Income / Total Assets E
TDTA Total Deposits / Total Assets L
LIQATA Liquid Assets / Total Assets L
TLTD Total Loans / Total Deposits L
In order to build our database, we have contacted local regulatory institu-
tions21. We have also used informations from the on-line database Banker’s Al-
manac22. It helps us to identify the name and the time of default.
We consider as default a bank which can’t operate whitout external support,
or which is already engaged into a procedure which leads to its exit from the
market. Therefore, a bank is in default when it’s under one of the following
procedure :
• external administration (regulatory and restructuring agency support23),
• banking licence suspension or revocation,
• liquidation,
• failure.
21Central banks, prudential regulatory and supervisory commissions, deposits insurance
funds, banking associations and federations, regulatory commissions associations, and restruc-
turing agencies.
22www.bankersalmanac.com
23NPL buyout, recapitalization, ...
12Following this typology, we have 297 defaults for the period 1990 to 2002 for
34 EME. Keeping only commercial, savings and investment banks, and dropping
years where residual defaults occurred, we ﬁnally get a database of 270 default
banks for which we have accounting data from BankScope24. We have respectively
24 defaults in 1997, 80 in 1998, 75 in 1999, 37 in 2000, 36 in 2001, and 18 in 2002.
We have then completed our database with accounting (balance sheet) and
governance (ownership structure) data from BankScope. Accounting data concern
details of balance sheet and proﬁt & loss positions. These data are annual and
denominated in thousands USD. They allow us to build CAMEL ratios proxies -
the risk factors of equation 2. The governance data give us information concerning
ﬁrst holding’s nationality, the holdings percent and their names.
We also included regulatory and institutional variables from Barth et al. [2001]
database25, which is the result of interviews with local regulatory institutions, and
institutional informations from La Porta et al. (LLSV) [1997, 1998] database.
These data are mainly qualitative and are grouped by country. LLSV’s dataset
contains various indicators and dummies reﬂecting institutional and governance
environment’s quality. The focus is put on stakeholders rights protection mecha-
nisms.
We have ﬁrst studied descriptive statistics of diﬀerent balance sheet ratios,
particularly their means for the state default versus non default. These statis-
tics were aberrant for small default banks, indicating that other factors lied at
the source of their problems (probably macroeconomic ones). We have there-
fore bounded the variable Total Assets TA in order to eliminate small banks
(TA > Q1, ﬁrst quartile equals to 105.11 millions of USD). A ﬁrst size criterion
determines our sample. We have then focus on banks which main activity is
credit allocation, and therefore the main source of risk is credit risk, and we have
bounded the variables Net Loans in Total Assets NLTA (elimination of the ﬁrst
percentile p10, equals 25.32% of total assets) and Total Deposits to Total As-
sets TDTA (elimination of the ﬁrst p5, equals 26.81% of total assets). A second
bank’s activity criterion determines our sample.
We ﬁnally get a pooled sample of 894 banks for the period 1996 − 2002, of
which 61 defaults. Commercial banks compose the main part of our sample (more
than 95% of our sample). The main part of the defaults occur in 1997 and 1998,
respectively 23 and 17, and then 4, 9 and 7 in the following years - 1999, 2000
and 2001.
Table 3 shows the frequencies of defaults by country. Table 4 shows descriptive
statistics for the main balance sheet variables and ratios (in millions USD, the
ratios are in %).
24Frequencies of default and available banks are shown in table 8 in appendix.
25Available on-line on www.worldbank.org.
13Table 3: Defaults frequencies by country
Country Defaults Banks Def. freq.
Argentina 7 151 4.64
Bolivia 7 23 30.43
Colombia 3 104 2.88
Ecuador 2 63 3.17
Indonesia 1 68 1.47
Korea (South) 12 33 36.36
Mexico 2 95 2.11
Malaysia 19 82 23.17
Peru 4 100 4
Thailand 3 54 5.56
Venezuela 1 121 0.8
61 894 6.82
3.2 Results
We ran two regressions corresponding to two diﬀerent speciﬁcations in order to
estimate equation 1 :
1. regression (1.1) with proxies variables of the regulatory environment (Barth
et al. [2001]),
2. regression (1.2) with proxies variables of the regulatory environment (Barth
et al. [2001]) and proxies variables of the institutional environment (La
Porta et al. [1997, 1998].
Our results are shown in table 5 hereafter. The repartition of the banks by
excess risk classes is the following (dependent variable CNPL from equation 1)
26 :
(1.1) (1.2)
1 234 (32.19%) 1 233 (33.1%)
2 362 (49.79%) 2 343 (48.73%)
3 233 (18.02%) 3 128 (18.17%)
We have then ran two regressions of the CAMEL type logit model (equation
2) including the estimated values of d CNPL (from (1.1) and (1.2)) as depen-
dent variables to explain default (regressions (2.1) et (2.2)). Table 6 presents
26The diﬀerence of frequencies comes from a higher number of missing observations when we
include La Porta et al. [1997, 1998] variables.
14Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the main balance sheet variables and ratios
Defaults
Variables N mean std.dev. min. max.
TA 61 5053.76 8211.61 108.3 35254.67
NI 61 -144.2 490.74 -3203.08 164.66
ROA 61 -4.62 17.52 -112.21 2.06
NLTA 61 60.36 12.65 26.78 90.79
TDTA 61 79.79 11.74 38.4 99.34
EQTA 61 4.77 18.62 -120.92 28.26
EQTL 61 8.05 35.5 -221.93 59.3
LLRGL 61 7.88 11.05 1.19 60.24
NPLGL 61 16.66 13.64 1.83 65.72
PEXP 61 27.29 12.54 1.12 54.75
NIM 61 2.76 7.71 -52.99 13.15
LIQATA 61 18 8.82 4.88 42.87
TLTD 61 76.77 16.02 29.11 124.1
Non defaults
Variables N mean std.dev. min. max.
TA 833 3366.76 7110 106.7 56740.29
NI 833 -13.45 209.54 -2461.5 880.32
ROA 833 0.62 3.56 -35.15 23.66
NLTA 833 56.8 13.74 25.38 92.35
TDTA 833 75.92 12.66 18.51 95.19
EQTA 833 11.25 6.65 -15.25 53.45
EQTL 833 21.28 13.76 -31.93 100.98
LLRGL 833 6.63 5.65 0 50.56
NPLGL 833 10.68 11.23 0 89.59
PEXP 833 33.44 12.44 0.29 76.96
NIM 833 8.2 7.67 -8.06 55.8
LIQATA 833 23.24 13.35 0.34 69.08
TLTD 833 77.36 27.02 27.68 362.93






















Log L −648.03 −638.88
% concordant 71.3% 70.1%
∗∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 1%
∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 5%
our results27. Table 7 presents the results of a binary CAMEL logit model, for
comparison28.
27Selected CAMEL proxies ratios come from a previous study which objective was to build an
EWS type model for EME banks, which allowed us to validate the applicability of the CAMEL
typology to these banks (Godlewski [2003]). We have also ran two other binary logit regressions
with signiﬁcant variables form the CAMEL model and environmental variables used to explain
the excess risk indicator in equation 1 for comparison. The results are shown in table 9 in
appendix.
28We only present the results of the logistic regression made on the sample corresponding to
regression (2.1).
16Table 6: Estimation results of equation 2 from our model
Variables (2.1) marginal ε (2.2) marginal ε
eﬀect eﬀect
d CNPL 2.266∗∗ 0.161 0.174 1.969∗ 0.142 0.155
(0.93) (1.01)




NIM −0.215∗∗∗ -0.0153 -0.407 −0.2∗∗∗ -0.0144 -0.383
(0.05) (0.05)
LIQATA −0.048∗∗∗ -0.00341 -0.38 −0.048∗∗∗ -0.00346 -0.4
(0.01) (0.01)
TLTD −0.007∗ -0.0005 -0.219 −0.006∗ -0.00043 -0.203
(0.004) (0.004)
N. def. 56 55
N 727 704
Khi-2 676.98∗∗∗ 648.94∗∗∗
Log L −165.43 −163.51
McFadden R2 67.17% 67.1%
Def. reclass. rate 83.9% 87.3%
∗∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 1%
∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 5%
∗ : signiﬁcant at 10%
ε : elasticity
We get the following estimated probabilities d CNPL29 : for equation (1.1) we
have p(CNPL = 1) = 0.345, p(CNPL = 2) = 0.441 and p(CNPL = 3) = 0.214,
and for equation (1.2) p(CNPL = 1) = 0.347, p(CNPL = 2) = 0.439 and
p(CNPL = 3) = 0.214.
3.3 Discussion
First holding from an EME (PHOLDEM) has a positive impact on excess risk.
We can explain this result by the fact that the state often remains the ﬁrst holding
in EME. It doesn’t discipline and monitor correctly and eﬃciently bank risk
taking behavior (forbearance, anticipation of intervention in case of diﬃculites,
29Calculated on samples containing 727 and 704 banks respectively.
17Table 7: Estimation results of a CAMEL binary logit model
Variables CAMEL(2.1) marginal ε
eﬀect
EQTL −0.022∗ -0.00156 -0.157
(0.01)
NPLGL 0.002 0.00014 0.011
(0.01)
PEXP 0.002 0.00014 0.023
(0.01)
NIM −0.172∗∗∗ -0.0122 -0.346
(0.05)
LIQATA −0.048∗∗∗ -0.00341 -0.377
(0.02)







Def. reclass. rate 78.6%
∗∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 1%
∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 5%
∗ : signiﬁcant at 10%
ε : elasticity
...). The knowledge transfer, particularly the art of risk management, is also less
important as with a ﬁrst holding from a developed country.
A higher minimal regulatory capital ratio (MCAR) increases excess risk. Gen-
erally this ratio is higher in EME (closer to 12% than to 8%), in order to limit
excess risk and to force banks to recapitalize, and become more solvent and sound.
However, as we have seen, a higher regulatory capital can incite to excess risk,
as additional capital imply additional eﬀort in term of proﬁtability, which can be
achieved by increasing risk taking.
The existence of a deposits insurance system (DEPOSITINS) reduces excess
risk. This result seems counter-intuitive concerning the moral hazard problem
which is a consequence of such system. However, such guarantee fund protect
depositors, and can therefore reduce excess risk needed to generate more proﬁts,
in order to signal good performances and avoid liquidity problems.
The frequency of on-site exams (FREQEXAM) reduces excess risk, therefore
18producing some regulatory discipline. The threat of frequent exam which can
result in licence suspension or revocation (and charter value elimination) in case
of non conformity to regulatory standards can incite the bank to adopt a more
conservative risk taking behavior.
Auditor’s reports on miscmanagement (MISCMGTREP) have a positive
eﬀect on excess risk in the ﬁrst regression (1.1) and a negative eﬀect in the
second one (1.2). We were expecting a negative sign of this coeﬃcient, because
such report can be the basis for an ulterior regulatory intervention. Without the
institutional variables (RULEOFLAW and LEGSY SFR), the sign is positive,
signaling either that this type of threat is not credible (auditor’s negligeancy for
example), or that such report have an adverse eﬀect, inciting bank managers to
a ”maximum” level of excess risk before a probable regulator’s intervention after
a negative report on miscmanagement. In the second regression (1.2) the sign
is negative, indicating a discipline eﬀect of the auditor’s report, controlling for
country’s rule of law quality.
Legal action against neglecting auditors (LEGALACT) have a negative im-
pact on excess risk. Through disciplining auditors, the regulator can aﬀect bank’s
incentives, because its excessive risk taking will be found out easier if audits are
done more eﬃciently.
Abroad loans making prohibition (PROHIBABL) have a positive impact on
excess risk, because such regulation reduces loans portfolio diversiﬁcation oppor-
tunities (Allen and Gale [2000])30.
These results put forward existing complementarity of these factors to the
market discipline which is considered as a corporate governance mechanism (Jensen
[1993]). These factors have also a positive eﬀect on regulatory discipline. Our
results show the importance of institutional environment in enchancing other cor-
porate governance mechanisms eﬃciency, and therefore in reducing excessive risk
taking incentives.
Referring to our results, bank regulation have a signiﬁcant impact on excess
risk in EME’s banks. This impact can be adverse, as with minimum regulatory
capital (MCAR). Regulatory discipline seems eﬃcient, curbing excessive risk
taking incentives.
Taking into account the correlations, we have dropped variables DEPOSITINS
and LEGALACT in regression (1.2) in order to include variables RULEOFLAW
and LEGSY SFR. RULEOFLAW is the most signiﬁcant variable and the least
correlated with other explicative variables of our model (comparing to other in-
dicators of stakeholders and debtholders rights protection). It allows us also to
include a proxy of rule of law quality and test its impact on excess risk. Vari-
able LEGSY SFR has been introduced to control legal system’s origin (dummies
30A potential positive impact of such regulation, and therefore a negative sign, concerns
the restriction of bank activities to local credit markets, on which local banks have better
information and can better assess its riskiness.
19variables of british and german legal systems were correlated with other explica-
tive variables of our model). The signs of these two institutional variables are
negative, indicating that excess risk is reduced in a state of law. The french legal
origin have a signiﬁcant impact.
The impact of institutional factors on excess risk is signiﬁcant. An institu-
tional environment of quality reduces excessive risk taking incentives.
When we introduce the variable d CNPL in our model of bank default pre-
diction (equation 2), and after controlling other CAMEL risk factors variables,
we ﬁnd that only proxies of risk factors C, E and L are signiﬁcant with co-
herent signs. The marginal eﬀect of d CNPL is the most important, indicating
that the default probability is highly sensitive to d CNPL, and therefore to in-
stitutional factors which aﬀect excess risk. This variable contributes the most
to default probability. In term of elasticity, a one percent increase of variables
NIM or LIQUIDASSET reduces more default probability (respectively 40.7%
and 38.3% in equation (2.1), and 38% and 40% in equation (2.2)). The elasticity
of d CNPL is the lowest (17.4% and 15.5% respectively). It seems that banks in
EME of our sample should concentrate more on margin and asset’s liquidity to
reduce their default probability.
We remark that default reclassiﬁcation rates are better when we use our two
step approach, with the integration of the estimated excess risk indicator d CNPL
from equation 1 (83.9% and 87.3% respectively)31, compared to those from a
CAMEL binary logit model (78.64%). The default reclassiﬁcation rate derived
from our speciﬁcation including institutional variables (regression (1.2)) is the
highest.
The default reclassiﬁcation rates derived from CAMEL binary logit models
including the same regulatory and institutional (table 9 in appendix, regressions
(CAMEL 1) and (CAMEL 2)) remains lower (82.1% and 81.6% respectively).
4 Conclusion
Risk taking behavior in banks can be aﬀected by the regulatory and institutional
characteristics, and can degenerate into excess risk. This excess risk increases
bank’s default probability.
In this article we applied a two step logit model to study the impact of the
regulatory and institutional environment on excess risk, and the relationship be-
tween this factor and bank default. Applying our methodology to a micro and
macro economic database (balance sheet data from BankScope, and regulatory
and institutional data from Barth et al. [2001] and La Porta et al. [1997, 1998])
of EME banks, we ﬁnd evidence which validate our hypothesis.
31At the default rate of our sample, approximatively 7%.
20This type of environment have a signiﬁcant impact on excess risk, particularly
bank regulation, regulatory discipline, and rule of law quality. The estimation of
an excess risk indicator depending on this environmental factors allows, after con-
trolling for capitalization, earnings and liquidity factors, better explanation and
discrimination of one year horizon default probability with higher default reclas-
siﬁcation rates comparing to an alternative speciﬁcation with a CAMEL binary
logit model. This result holds even when we introduce these same environmental
factors into CAMEL binary logit models.
The integration of an excess risk indicator, which is a function of the regula-
tory and institutional environment, increases the explanatory and discriminatory
power of an EME’s bank default prediction model. Our approach proves also
the importance and relevance of regulatory and institutional factors in driving
excessive risk taking behavior.
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26APPENDIX
Figure 1: CAMEL rating elements
C Capital Adequacy measures capital buﬀer against unexpected
losses,
A Asset Quality (particularly loans portfolio quality),
M Management Quality,
E Earnings measures historical stability and composition of earn-
ings,
L Liquidity measures bank’s exposition to liquidity risk.
27Table 8: Bank defaults frequencies by country
Country Country Available Default Default
code banks banks rate
Argentina AR 135 28 20.74%
Bosnia-Herzegovina BA 22 1 4.55%
Bulgaria BG 28 2 7.14%
Bolivia BO 16 7 43.75%
Brazil BR 188 19 10.11%
Colombia CO 56 9 16.07%
Costa Rica CR 35 3 8.57%
Czech republic CZ 32 2 6.25%
Ecuador EC 43 2 4.65%
Estonia EE 12 4 33.33%
Hong Kong HK 105 1 0.95%
Croatia HR 48 8 16.67%
Indonesia ID 93 34 36.56%
Korea (South) KR 55 33 60.00%
Lithuania LT 13 2 15.38%
Latvia LV 28 4 14.29%
Mexico MX 46 4 8.70%
Malaysia MY 65 32 49.23%
Nicaragua NI 12 6 50.00%
Panama PA 86 8 9.30%
Peru PE 34 5 14.71%
Poland PL 58 1 1.72%
Paraguay PY 45 3 6.67%
Romania RO 36 2 5.56%
Russia RU 166 6 3.61%
Singapore SG 59 7 11.86%
Slovenia SI 27 1 3.70%
Slovakia SK 27 4 14.81%
Thailand TH 40 17 42.50%
Taiwan TW 48 3 6.25%
Ukraine UA 44 2 4.55%
Uruguay UY 57 6 10.53%
Venezuela VE 71 1 1.41%
Yugoslavia YU 23 4 17.39%
Defaults are cumulated over 6 years.
28Table 9: Estimation results of alternative CAMEL binary logit models























N. def. 56 49
N 727 704
Khi-2 703.64∗∗∗ 718.08∗∗∗
Log L −152.1 −128.94
McFadden R2 69.82% 73.58%
Def. reclass. rate 82.1% 81.6%
∗∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 1%
∗∗ : signiﬁcant at 5%
∗ : signiﬁcant at 10%
29